This paper examines the trajectory of growth in the Global South. Before the 1500s all countries were roughly at the same level of development, but from the 1500s Western countries started to grow faster than the rest of the world and PPP GDP per capita by 1950 in the US, the richest Western nation, was nearly 5 times higher than the world average. Since 1950 this ratio stabilized -not only Western Europe and Japan improved their relative standing in per capita income versus the US, but also East Asia, South Asia and some developing countries in other regions started to bridge the gap with the West. After nearly half of millennium of growing economic divergence, the world seems to have entered the era of convergence. The factors behind these trends are analyzed; implications for the future and scenarios are considered.
In 1500 the ratio of average per capita income in the West (Western Europe and "off-springs" -USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand) and the South (all other countries) was approximately 1:1, by 1900 it increased to 6:1 and remained at this level for the next 100 years (if China is excluded, the ratio actually increased, but not as fast as in the past - fig. 1 , 2). Source: Maddison, 2013. In the second half of the 20th century, however, we witnessed, for the first time in half a millennium, examples of successful catch-up development. Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, South Korea (in chronological order) in the 1950-80s were the only states/territories that successfully caught up with the West and became developed countries. In recent decades a similar process is underway in Southeast Asia and in China. Together with the recent acceleration of growth of India and some other developing countries it could signify the reaching of a tipping point in the Great Divergence (Nayyar, 2013; WESS, 2010) . It may well be that in future the world will experience a gradual global convergence in levels of income, so that in the 21 st century the gap between the West and the South will narrow and perhaps will mostly disappear ( fig. 1, 2 ).
Figure 2. PPP GDP per capita (in 1990 International Geary-Khamis dollars) as a % of the US level
Source: Maddison, 2013 .
True, other regions of the global South (Sub-Sahara Africa, East Europe and former Soviet Union) have not been catching up and some have even been falling behind, especially in the 1980s-90s, during the heydays of Washington consensus (O'Campo et al., 2007) . But, for the first time in 500 years the average gap in per capita GDP has stopped widening and started to close for some major economies. Source : Milanovic, 2009. It is observed in the UN World Economic and Social Survey 2014 (WESS, 2014 ) that between-country inequality has started to decline since 2000 -the reversal of the trend towards divergence in national income levels that prevailed previously.
Why income gap between the West and developing countries that was growing for nearly half of the millennium since 1500 has started to close down? Is it a temporary trend or a permanent one? To answer these questions, we first take a closer look at several major attempts towards catch-up development in the 20th century (Popov, 2014) .
XX century catch up attempts
There were cases of falling out of the rich country club -the most prominent one was Argentina in the XX century ( Source: Maddison, 2013 .
The USSR in the 1930s-60s was the first major non-Western country to experience successful catch-up development and to narrow the income gap with the West, although in the 1970-80s the gap ceased to narrow and widened in the 1990s. 5 ). In fact, until the 1960s, the USSR and Japan were the only two major developing countries that successfully bridged the gap with the West (fig. 2 ). Interestingly enough, though, the growth rates of labor productivity in the 1930s, the period of dramatic structural shifts, were high (3% a year), but not exceptional, whereas the highest growth rates were observed in the 1950s (6 %) - fig. 6 (Popov, 2007) . The total factor productivity (TFP) growth rates over decades increased from 0.6 percent annually in the 1930s to 2.8 percent in the 1950s and then fell monotonously becoming negative in the 1980s (table 1) . The decade of the 1950s was thus the "golden period" of Soviet economic growth ( fig. 6 ). The patterns of Soviet growth of the 1950s in terms of growth accounting were very similar to the Japanese growth of the 1950s-70s and Korean and Taiwanese growth in the 1960-80s-fast increases in labor productivity counterweighted the decline in capital productivity, so that the TFP increased markedly (Table 1) . But high Soviet economic growth lasted only for less than two decades (figs. 5, 6), whereas in East Asia, it continued for three to four decades, propelling Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan to the rank of developed countries. Among many reasons for the decline in growth rate in the USSR in the 1960s-1980s, the most crucial one appears to be the "computation problem" -inability of a centrally planned economy to balance supply and demand of millions of goods and services without losses. This led to inadequate flow of investment into replacement of retired fixed capital stock (Popov, 2007 (Popov, , 2014a : because the task of renovating physical capital contradicted the short-term goal of fulfilling planned targets Soviet planners therefore preferred to invest in building new capacities instead of upgrading old ones. Hence, after the massive investment of the 1930s in the USSR (the Big Push), the highest productivity was achieved after the period equal to the service life of capital stock (about twenty years) before there emerged a need for massive investment into replacing retired stock. Afterwards, capital stock started to age rapidly, sharply reducing capital productivity and lowering labor productivity and the TFP growth rate. (1950/53/65-85/88/90) 2.6 -3.1 1.9-2.4 Source: Easterly, Fisher, 1995. If this explanation is correct, a centrally planned economy is doomed to experience a growth slowdown after three decades of high growth following a Big Push. In retrospect, the relatively short Chinese experience with the CPE (1949/59-79) looks superior to the Soviet excessively long experience . This is one of the reasons to believe that transition to the market economy in the Soviet Union would have been more successful, if it had started in the 1960s (Popov, 2007) . Some other countries in Latin America, Africa and Middle East were temporarily catching up with the West in the XX century, but their success normally did not last. In the 1950s-1970s many developing countries experienced relatively fast growth and the narrowing of the gap, but lost momentum after the debt crisis of the early 1980s. Economists started to talk about the "lost decade" in Latin America (1980s) and in Africa (1990s) . The trajectory of Brazil (Fig. 7) is a rather typical in this respect. 9 ). At the very least, the growth of communist China cannot be called "development by invitation". It was also argued that large US aid to South Vietnam did not lead to the same results as in South Korea and Taiwan (Gray, 2013) Europe rapid growth was observed in Greece, Ireland, Montenegro, Portugal, Spain (Table 2) .
Besides, since 1950, even though there were no major breakthroughs in catch up development of the whole regions of LA (Latin America), SSA, SA and MENA, the gap in levels of economic development between these regions and the West stopped widening. 
Growth, policies and institutions
The question why some countries are growing faster than the others is the central one in economics. It is in fact the old question about the nature and the causes of the wealth of nations (Smith, 1776) . In retrospective view of economic growth this question is often formulated as "why the West got rich before the Rest?" and "why some developing countries are catching up with the West, but others do not?" Unfortunately, there is no consensus among economists what exact policies are needed for engineering high growth (Popov, 2011a) .
It is said that failure is always an orphan, whereas success has many parents. No wonder, both neo-classical and structuralist economists claim that economic success stories in the Global South prove what they were saying all along. It is not difficult to find many contradictory statements in the literature about the reasons of economic success: economic liberalization and free trade are said to be the foundations of rapid growth in some countries, whereas successes of other countries are credited to industrial policy and protectionism; foreign direct investment are normally considered as a factor contributing to growth, but it is pointed out that it did not play any significant role in the developmental success of Japan, South Korea and pre-1990s China. Privatization of state enterprises, free trade, liberalization of the financial system, democratic political institutions -all these factors, just to name a few, are usually believed to be pre-requisites of successful development, but it is easy to point out to success stories, not associated with these factors 2 . It is debated whether foreign aid boosts growth or merely crowds out domestic savings and investment (United Nations, 2003; Channing, Jones, Tarp, 2010) .
In the 1970s the breathtaking economic success of Japan that transformed itself into a developed country just in two postwar decades was explained by "Japan incorporated" structure of the economy -special relations between (a) the government and companies (the omni-powerful Ministry of International Trade and Industry -MITI), (b) between banks and non-financial companies (bank-based financial system), (c) between companies and workers (life time employment). After the stagnation of the 1990s, and especially after 1997 Asian financial crisis that affected Japan as well, these same factors were largely labeled as clear manifestations of "crony capitalism" that should be held responsible for the stagnation (Popov, 2008) .
The analysis of policies that contributed most to poverty reduction and the achievement of other Millennium Development Goals in 2000-15 also suggests that there is no single strategy that leads to success under all conditions and at all development stages (WESS, 2015) .
Reforms that are needed to achieve success are different for countries with different backgrounds and at different stages of development (Polterovich, Popov, 2005; .
Manufacturing growth is like cooking a good dish-all needed ingredients should be in the right proportion; if only one is under-or overrepresented, the 'chemistry of growth' will not happen. Fast economic growth can materialize in practice only if several necessary conditions are met at the same time. Rapid growth is a complicated process that requires a number of crucial inputs-infrastructure, human capital, even land distribution in agrarian countries, strong state institutions, economic stimuli, among other things. Once one of these crucial necessary ingredients is missing, the growth just does not take off. Rodrik, Hausmann and Velasco (2005) talk about 'binding constraints' that hold back economic growth; finding these constraints is the task of 'growth diagnostics'. In some cases, these constraints are associated with the lack of market liberalization, in others, with the lack of state capacity or human capital or infrastructure. Why economic liberalization worked in Central Europe, but did not work in SSA and LA? The answer, according to the outlined approach, would be that in Central Europe the missing ingredient was economic liberalization, whereas in SSA and LA there was a lack of state capacity, not the lack of market liberalization. Why liberalization worked in China and central Europe and did not work in CIS? Because in the CIS it was carried out in such a way as to undermine the state capacity-the precious heritage of socialist past-whereas in Central Europe, and even more so in China, the state capacity did not decline substantially during transition (Popov, 2014) .
It is difficult therefore, if not impossible, to find universal recipes for rapid growth. However, there is a different way to approach the question -to look not at policies enacted in fast growing countries ("good" policies vary depending on initial conditions and stages of development), but at the institutions that were conducive to adopting these policies or at least made them possible. Here we consider only state institutions, or to be more precise -state institutional capacity defined as the ability of the state to enforce rules and regulations.
Subjective measures of the state capacity -indices of government effectiveness, rule of law, corruptions, etc. -have a number of shortcomings (Popov, 2011b ), so we suggest objective indicators, such as crime rate, murder rate, the share of shadow economy -the ability of the state to enforce its monopoly on violence and monopoly on taxation.
The general rule is that developed countries, East Asia, South Asia and MENA countries have murder rates of 1-10 murders per 100,000 inhabitants and shadow economy of less than 30% of GDP, whereas in SSA, Latin America and some former Soviet Union republics (Baltics, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine) the murder rate is higher by the order of magnitude (10-100 murders per 100,000) and the shadow economy is way over 30% of GDP.
Economic growth in large regions of the Global South correlates strongly with the murder rate and shadow economy (negative correlation -the higher the murder rate and the shadow economy, the lower is growth). East Asia is ahead of everyone in terms of growth, followed by South Asia and MENA, while Latin America, SSA and FSU are falling behind.
In fact, the murder rate and the share of the shadow economy -the objective indicators of the institutional capacity of the state -turn out to be the best institutional predictors of the long term growth rates of GDP per capita. In regressions for over 50 years periods (1960-75, 1975-2000, 2000-13 The standard way to deal with the endogeneity is to look for the instrumental variables, but it is virtually impossible to find such variables for institutions that are not correlated with growth. It is possible though to argue that murder rates did not change much in recent half century, and in this case the endogeneity argument does not hold: the murder rate is not influenced by economic growth or is influenced so little that changes during half a century are not significant.
Partial support for this argument is provided by data at fig. 13 Source: List of countries by intentional homicide rate (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_intentional_homicide_rate). Data are taken from different sources (mostly national data provided to WHO) and sometimes are not strictly comparable.
Genesis of institutions
Most of the participants of the recent debate about the major factors of economic growth (geography versus institutions versus international trade) seem to have concluded that institutions trump all other factors (Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi, 2002) . In an article with the self-explanatory title "Institutions Rule" the authors examine the impact of three basic factors on growth -geography (proxied by the distance to the equator and regional dummies), trade openness (the share of trade in GDP), and institutions. The difficulty, of course, is that all three factors are interlinked and that institutions and trade openness not only influence growth, but also depend on growth themselves. To properly estimate the contribution of each factor, the authors instrument institutions using the settlers' mortality rate, like Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) , and instrument the share of trade in GDP with the predicted share of trade (from gravity models). Then, after giving a "fair chance" to geographical variables to compete with the instrumented variables of institutions and trade openness, they conclude that "institutions rule," that is, the impact of institutions is most crucial. Institutions are largely, but not totally, determined by geography, and in turn they determine trade openness and growth. The direct impact of geography on growth (apart from the impact through institutions) turns out to be insignificant. In short, it turns out that that institutions trump geography and that institutional capacity is not always determined by geography.
The difference from the straightforward geographical determinism approach is thus obvious, but there is an important difference from the Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) approach as well. Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi (2002) believe that geography, particularly settlers' mortality rates, is a good predictor of institutional quality, but not the major cause of it. The genesis of institutions is a complex process with many determinants, and finding an appropriate econometric instrument is not the same as finding the proper explanation. Rodrik (2004) explains the difference using the following example: the variation in GDP per capita in countries that were never colonies is no less substantial than among colonized countries -here, Ethiopia and Afghanistan are at the one end of the spectrum and Japan is at the other end with
Turkey and Thailand lying somewhere in between. What accounts for the different quality of institutions in this non-colonized part of the world?
There are two major schools of thought that offer different answers to these questions (see Popov, 2014 , for description and references), one recognizes key role of institutions, the otherdoes not. One (evolutionary or Western) school hypothesizes states that countries that we now call developed, or the West, acquired in the 16 th century and afterwards some features and institutions that were absent in more traditional societies (Landes, 1998; Mokyr, 2002 -to name just a couple of contemporary authors). The list of these features ranges from abolition of serfdom and protestant ethics to protection of property rights and free universities.
Another school (Oriental) questions the logic of evolution triggered by social forces themselves (Diamond, 1997; Pomerantz, 2000; Wong, 1997 -once again, just to give several contemporary examples) and pays special attention to seemingly minor historical events-fortunate and unfortunate, but mostly accidental -that pre-determined the development of countries and continents for centuries to come. "In this view, -explain the editors of the book that examines important unrealized counterfactuals in human history, -Western dominance was the byproduct of natural forces that reflect no credit on Western civilization: geographical accidents such as location of mountains and coastlines, geological accidents such as the ready availability of coal or gold or arable land, climatological accidents such as the timing of the ice ages or the direction of the ocean currents, and biological accidents (not always so accidental) that affect the susceptibility of various population groups to lethal diseases" (Tetlock, Lebow, Parker, 2009, p. 9) .
In recent decades the rise of Asia gave additional credibility to theories that reject the superiority of Western economic model and the inevitability of the Western success. "As Japan, the Asian Tigers and China developed into major economic powers, -writes Ian Morris, -more and more scholars concluded that theories explaining West's success through long-term cultural, environmental, or racial causes simply could not be right. The big story in the world history, they began suggesting, was not the long-term inexorable rise of the West; it was the tale of multipolar world, which the West had only recently, temporarily, and perhaps even accidently come to dominate" (Morris, 2013, p. 2) .
The problem with these explanations is that there were many countries before the 16 th century with social structures that possessed or were conducive to many of the same features that are credited for the growth acceleration by the Western school and with many minor accidental events that are said to promote growth by the supporters of the Oriental school. But these countries never experienced productivity growth comparable to the one that started in Britain and the Netherlands in the 16 th century and later -in the rest of Europe (0.2-0.3% a year in 1500-1800 and 1% and more a year afterwards).
A different interpretation accepted in this paper is that dismantling traditional collectivist institutions in Western countries was associated with increased income inequality and even decrease in life expectancy, but allowed the redistribution of income in favor of savings and investment at the expense of consumption (Popov, 2014) . The elimination of collectivist It is not the abundance of competition or entrepreneurship or ideas for technological innovations that allowed the West to accelerate the growth rates of productivity by the order of magnitude, it is first and foremost the abundance of savings and investment that resulted from growing income inequalities and allowed to increase the capital/labor ratio and to cast in metal the ideas for new products and technologies. To pit it differently, the West became rich not due to its inventiveness and entrepreneurial spirit, but due to cruel and merciless dismantling of community that previously provided social guarantees to the poorest.
When the same pattern was applied to developing countries (through colonialism -Latin America, Sub-Sahara Africa, or voluntary Westernization in an attempt to catch up -Russian Empire), it resulted in the destruction of traditional institutions, increase in income inequality, and worsening of starting positions for catch-up development. This group of countries replicated the Western exit from the Malthusian trap -they experienced immediate increase in income differentiation, the rise in savings and investment and in the growth of productivity, but at a price of rising social inequality and deterioration of institutional capacities.
Other developing countries (East Asia, South Asia, and Middle East and North Africa -MENA)
were less affected by colonialism and managed to retain their traditional institutions. This delayed the transition to modern economic growth (Kuznets, 1966) until mid-20 th century, but allowed to preserve good starting position for economic growth -low inequality and strong institutions. Eventually slow technical progress allowed them to find another (and less painful)
exit from the Malthusian trap-increased income permitted to raise the share of investment in GDP without major increase in income inequality, without worsening of institutional capacity and decrease in life expectancy.
More Westernized countries of the Global South (LA and Russian Empire) raised their savingsinvestment rate and exited Malthusian trap earlier that the others, in the 18 th century, but at a price of undermining necessary conditions for future growth -low inequalities and strong institutions. So LA and Russia experienced some acceleration of growth afterwards, but it was not enough to catch up with the West. Colonization of SSA (except for South Africa), unlike colonization of LA and Westernization of Russia, did not result in any considerable transfer of technology and human capital, but only increased inequalities and undermined institutions. So SSA countries were disadvantaged on all counts and had the worst growth record in the world.
On the contrary, most of less Westernized countries of East and South Asia and MENA managed to preserve low inequality and efficient collectivist institutions. Their savingsinvestment ratios stayed at a level below 10% until mid-20 th century, so they did not grow before that, but once saving started to increase gradually, it turned out they have all preconditions for fast growth. Some of them became economic miracles, rapidly catching up with the West (East Asia), others were speeding up their development in recent decades (South Asia), while others (MENA countries) are probably best positioned to accelerate their economic growth in the future.
The general model of global divergence is presented at the scheme below (Popov, 2014) . Like all schemes this one is a simplification: it does not allow capturing all the diversity of circumstances, but allows tracing the main factors responsible for changes. The fact is that today there are two major groups of developing countries: one (East and South Asia, MENA) has relatively low inequalities, strong state institutions (low murder rate and share of shadow economy) and high savings and investment rate, the other (Latin America, Sub Sahara Africa, Russia and some former Soviet republics) has high inequalities, weak state institutions (high murder rate and shadow economy) and low savings and investment rate. Quite predictably the first group grows faster than the second. The data on inequalities, shadow economy and murder rates for these two groups of countries are shown at figs. 14 and 15. There are some exceptions, but generally the match is very good. 
Scheme. Explanation of the global divergence in growth since the 1500s

The South and the West in 2060
There are predictions that due to poor governance, corruptions, and the lack of structural reforms growth in emerging economies will slow down as compared to 2000-12 period when their growth was untypically high (Åslund, 2013) . But usually predictions are based on assumptions that particular growth oriented policies will or will not be enacted. In 1960
Rosentein-Rodan, widely regarded as the author of the Big Push theory, favored India, Burma, Argentina and Hong Kong as nations expected to achieve 3% annual growth per capita for a 5 year period. India, Burma and Argentina all achieved about 1.5% growth, whereas Hong Kong did much better. Chile, Egypt, Ghana and Jordan were also named for their unusually good growth prospects. But no one seems to have selected South Korea or Taiwan (Toye, 1987) . 47-49% in 2002-13) 6 , the level of these inequalities seems to be rather low given the size of the country (Popov, 2014) . In the 20 th century the growth of income differentiation within countries was held back by such checks and balances as socialist countries, popular movements, and resulting proliferation of welfare programs. In the 21 st century the rise of competitive low inequalities collectivist economic models in the Global South may reverse the trend towards rising inequalities that emerged in the 1980s, after the Soviet system lost its dynamism.
Second, the rise of China can lead to the profound reform of world economic order and international relations. Trade protectionism, industrial policy, undervaluation of the exchange rate via accumulation of foreign exchange reserves (also a variety of export-oriented industrial 6 Previously Chinese National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) had separate household surveys for rural and urban areas, so Ginis for the whole country were computed by researchers based on certain assumptions on ruralurban income disparities. By December 2012 the NBS had collected samples of 140,000 urban and rural households from 31 provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities. The NBS set up a new sample system and began to collect samples from 400,000 households starting from As the economic strength of the South increases in recent decades ( fig. 16 ), it can and will push for changes in international economic relations that are more conducive to its catch-up development (Arrighi, 2007) . The result may be the creation of more favorable conditions for catch-up development of all countries of the South and finally, the bridging of the gap between the world's 'rich' and 'poor'. Besides, the principles of international relations can change radically as well. "Beijing consensus" may not be a rigorous term (Ramo, 2004) , but it is clear that the Chinese approach to international politics (no interference into domestic affairs, no military interventions, no trade embargoes) provides the developing world with the real alternative of building relations with other countries. China rejects the use of force, embargoes and sanctions in international politics nearly as a matter of principle. Even in its relations with Taiwan China was always pushing for wider economic and cultural exchanges, whereas Taiwan authorities resisted. The new rules of the international relations may (1) explicitly limit the use of force only to cases of severe violations of non-political rights (i.e. mass repressions, hunger, ethnic violence, etc.) and prohibit the use of force against liberal authoritarian regime (just for the sake of "establishing democracy") and (2) prohibit unilateral military interventions (without the consent of the UN).
These "less expected" consequences of China's rise are probably creating already more favorable conditions for the catch up development of the South. The result may be the bridging of the gap between the world rich and the world poor, the West and developing countries.
If this interpretation of development experience is correct, the next large regions of successful catch up development would be MENA Islamic countries and South Asia -these regions seem to be most prepared to accept the Chinese model. But eventually Latin America, Sub-Sahara Africa and Russia would be catching up as well, so the Global South would finally come close to the West in productivity and per capita income.
